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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
courtin which it is held that evidence tending to show that a bystander
was a friend of the perpetrator and the perpetrator was aware of his
presence and nothing more is sufficient to support a conviction."' 8  Yet
there is language to that very effect in State v. Jarrell in which it is
stated that when the bystander is a friend of the perpetrator presence
alone may be regarded as encouraging.
In State v. Holland,'0 after discussing the law concerning aiding
and abetting, the court concluded that "the evidence here taken in its
light most favorable to the state, as is the rule of motion of non-suit, is
sufficient to justify a finding that the defendant's presence amounted to
active encouragement of his friend in the commission of the felonious as-
sault shown to have been committed. Full evidence here is laregly cir-
cumstantial but even so such evidence is a recognized and accepted instru-
mentality in the ascertaining of the truth and here the series of incrimi-
nating facts taken in its entirety makes out a prima facie case." 20
It should be pointed out that the writer finds no argument with the
rule of law that mere presence at the scene of the crime is insufficient to
constitute one an aider and abettor, but the unfortunate aspect of the
instant case is that by the Court's dismissal of the case with only a state-
ment that mere presence at the scene of the crime is insufficient to consti-
tute one an aider and abettor, the impression is given that the Court has
failed to recognize other circumstances which, coupled with presence,
have been held to constitute aiding and abetting.
THOMAS C. CREASY, JR.
Criminal Law-Arrest without Warrant for Misdemeanor
In State v. Mobley' it was held that without a warrant an officer
could not arrest a peaceful drunk, if he was not committing or about to
commit a breach of the peace. The only authority a peace officer had to
arrest one committing a misdemeanor was that given to all persons by
the common law, and codified in the North Carolina General Statutes, 2
that "Every person present at any riot, rout, affray or other breach of
the peace, shall endeavor to suppress and prevent the same, and if neces-
sary for that purpose shall arrest the offenders." There are, however,
exceptions created by statutes which conferred upon peace officers the
right to arrest without warrant one violating the motor vehicles laws in
his-presence3 or one violating the liquor laws when the officer has abso-
lute personal knowledge that the accused is transporting illegal liquor.4
"State v. Ham, 238 N. C. 94, 97, 76 S. E. 2d 346, 348 (1953).19234 N. C. 354, 67 S. E. 2d 272 (1951).
20 Id. at 356, 67 S. E. 2d at 273.
1240 N. C. 476, 83 S. E. 2d 100 (1954).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-39 (1953).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-183 (1953).
'N. C. GEN STAT. § 18-6 (1953).
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To remedy this situation Mr. justice Johnson suggested in State v.
Mobley5 that the legislature enact a single statewide statute authorizing
any peace officer to arrest without warrant (1) when a misdemeanor or
other criminal offense is committed in his presence, or (2) when he has
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has com-
mitted a criminal offense and will evade arrest if not immediately taken
into custody. In response the 1955 Legislature enacted a statute0 which
reads in part: "A peace officer may without warrant arrest a person:
(a) when the person to be arrested has committed a felony or misde-
meanor in the presence of the officer, or when the officer has reasonable
grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a felony
or misdemeanor in his presence. . . ." (Emphasis added.) It may be
surmised that the legislature, by adding "reasonable grounds to believe"
to the statute, intended to protect an officer from liability for false arrest
in instances where he clearly sees the offense committed in his presence
but the jury fails to convict. Nevertheless, the addition of this clause
may have enlarged substantially the authority of peace officers to arrest
without warrant for misdemeanors. It is with this possibility that the
note will deal.
"Reasonable grounds to believe" has by judicial construction been
given a fairly well defined meaning. It is more than mere suspicion.7
There must be such facts and circumstances as would cause ordinary men
to believe. Whether one does in fact believe is somewhat immaterial.
The courts, in determining "reasonable grounds to believe," are con-
cerned with the apparent facts within the knowledge of the officer at the
time, and with what such facts would make an ordinary observer think,
not with what are eventually shown to be the actual facts, or with what
one observer did, in fact, believe.8 Reliable information has been held
sufficient to give one reasonable grounds to believe.9 A tip from an
anonymous citizen obviously would not be reliable enough to give an
officer reasonable grounds to believe, while information from a known up-
standing citizen probably would. Thus an officer may learn of facts
through his own observation, word of another officer, or from informa-
tion given him by a private citizen that would give the officer reasonable
grounds to believe the accused is committing a crime. Thus, it is ap-
parent that the information sufficient to constitute reasonable grounds to
r240 N. C. at 488, 83 S. E. 2d at 108.8 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-41 (Supp. 1955).7 Dittberner v. State, 155 Tenn. 102, 291 S. W. 839 (1927).
8 MACHEN, THE LAW OF ARREST, p. 49 (1950).
* People v. Filas, 369 Ill. 78, 15 N. E. 2d 718 (1938). Information that a tall
slim man driving a Ford coup6, with a tan top, bearing license number 988-216,
had been sticking up oil stations gave the officer reasonable grounds to believe that
the driver of the described automobile was implicated in crime.
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believe may be derived solely from sources other than the arresting
officer's personal knowledge.
However the statute does not merely state that an officer can arrest
without warrant on reasonable grounds to believe. It says that an
officer must have reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is
committing a felony or misdemeanor in his presence. This presents the
question of just how much the words "in his presence" limit the officer's
power of arrest without warrant when he has reasonable grounds to
believe that the accused has committed a crime.
For a crime to be in the officer's presence, the officer must have more
than reliable information or a reasonable belief of its commission.10 He
must actually perceive the offense. The acts constituting the offense
must become known to him at the time they are committed through his
sense of sight or through his other senses." A Georgia court stated that
the words "in his presence" were synonymous with the words "within
his immediate knowledge," and that the officer need not see the act which
constitutes the crime if by any of his senses, he has personal knowledge of
its commission.12 Thus information, however reliable and even if based
on the informant's own personal observation, is not sufficient to cause a
crime to be in the officer's presence.'8 The officer must personally ob-
serve some part of the offense' 4 or at least enough to let him know what
is happening.' If, however, the officer is suspicious of a person, he
may inquire whether the person is committing a crime. Then if that
person voluntarily admits that he is committing a crime, the officer may
arrest him.' 6
It will be observed that some offences, such as carrying a concealed
weapon or transporting illegal liquor, could not be in the officer's
presence as concealment is part of the offense. Where a sheriff heard
shots in a road, and on investigation found that defendent had been one
of the persons standing in the road, the fact that there was a bulge in
defendent's pocket was not sufficient to cause it to be a crime committed
in the sheriff's presence. 1 But in a case in which an officer could see an
imprint in defendent's coat clearly enough to know that it was a gun, it
was held a crime in his presence. Yet it was still a concealed weapon
because an ordinary man would not detect it.18
Thus we have a combination in our arrest statute of two somewhat
"0 State v. DeHerrodora, 192 N. C. 749, 136 S. E. 6 (1926) ; Catching v. Com-
monwealth, 203 Ky. 151, 261 S. W. 1107 (1924).
11 State v. Pluth, 157 Minn. 145, 151, 195 N. W. 789, 791 (1923).
12 Piedmont Hotel Co. v. Henderson, 9 Ga. App. 672, 72 S. E. 51 (1911).
13 People v. Johnson, 86 Mich. 175, 48 N. W. 870 (1891).
14State v. Lutz, 85 W. Va. 330, 334, 101 S. E. 434, 439 (1919).
"
5Hughes v. Commonwealth, 19 Ky. 479, 41 S. W. 294 (1897).
Campbell v. Commonwealth, 203 Ky. 151, 261 S. W. 1107 (1924).
Banks v. Commonwealth, 202 Ky. 726, 261 S. W. 262 (1924).
' Robinson v. Commonwealth, 207 Ky. 53, 268 S. W. 840 (1925).
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mutually exclusive terms. "Reasonable grounds to believe" can consist
of information derived from others, and the officer need not have personal
knowledge of the crime. "In his presence," on the other hand, must
consist of immediate knowledge gained through the senses. Our Court
has not yet construed the new statute. Only one other state, New
Hampshire, has a statute9 similar to that of North Carolina, but no
cases have been found construing the New Hampshire statute.
Therefore, in the absence of any definitive interpretation of the statute,
the writer will attempt an analysis of the statute in terms of constructions
which might be made.
If an officer is acting on a tip, information, or hearsay, however re-
liable, the offense is clearly not one committed in his presence. Nor
should the addition to the statute of "reasonable grounds to believe"
alter the result in these cases in which the officer's knowledge is gained
through reports and not the use of his senses, since sensory perception is
a sine qua non for an offense to be in the officer's presence.
There is more difficulty, however, where the officer has perceived
through his senses enough facts and circumstances to give him "reasona-
ble grounds to believe" that a crime is being committed. This may be
no more than a well grounded belief, but he has gained his knowledge
through his senses. For example, in the case in which the sheriff heard
shots in the road, and later found one of the persons who had been in the
road, with a bulge in his coat. This was not a crime in the sheriff's
presence as he did not have immediate knowledge of the commission of
the crime. However, the sheriff did have reasonable grounds to believe
that the person was carrying a concealed weapon, and he gained his in-
formation through the use of his senses. Though this was not a crime
in the sheriff's presence, it could be argued that the facts were sufficient
to constitute "reasonable grounds to believe" that the offense was com-
mitted in the sheriff's presence since the facts were detected through the
use of his senses.
Allowing an officer to arrest under these circumstances would also
have far reaching effects on the law of search and seizure. It would
create an indirect way to circumvent the requirements for search without
a warrant, by allowing an officer to make an arrest under the above
circumstances and then make a lawful search incident to such arrest ;20
20 N. H. RSA § 594-10.
20 Mr. Justice Clarkson has suggested that if an officer has a reasonable belief
that a person may be arrested and held until a warrant could be obtained, or that
illegal goods may be seized without a warrant. However, these suggestions aren't
helpful because there is no question but that an officer may search incident to a lawful
arrest and does not need to hold the person until a warrant can be obtained. Nor
can an officer seize illegal goods without a warrant unless he either has arrested the
person accused or has absolute personal knowledge of the possession of the illegal
goods by the accused. (State v. Jenkins, 195 N. C. 747, 143 S. E. 538 (1928) and
State v. Hickey, 198 N. C. 45, 150 S. E. 615 (1929).)
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for it is well settled that an officer making an arrest has authority to
search the place of arrest of his prisoner and to take from him any
dangerous weapons or anything that he may deem necessary to his own
or to the public safety, to prevent escape, or which he believes to be
connected with the offense charged or may give a clue as to the commis-
sion of the crime.2
1
The section of the North Carolina General Statutes 22 dealing with
illegal transportation of liquor states that an officer must have absolute
personal knowledge that such vehicle or baggage contains illegal liquor
in order to search the same without a warrant. Absolute personal knowl-
edge was defined in State v. Godette23 as knowledge acquired through
the sense of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, or touching. The court
there also said that it is not necessary that the officer should see the con-
traband, but he must have direct personal knowledge through his hearing
or other senses of the commission of the crime.
North Carolina apparently follows this rule of absolute personal
knowledge in the search without warrant of a vehicle or baggage for
contraband other than liquor.24 Contrasted with North Carolina's posi-
tion on this point is the "probable cause" rule which obtains in the
Federal Courts. "Probable cause is a belief reasonably arising out of
the circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or
other vehicle contains that which is subject to seizure and destruction. 2 r5
Thus it seems that under the Federal rule an officer could, without
warrant, search an automobile when he has reliable information or a well
grounded belief that the automobile is transporting contraband, while in
North Carolina an officer must have absolute personal knowledge through
his senses that the vehicle contains contraband in order to search it with-
out a warrant. To allow an officer to arrest for a misdemeanor of which
he does not have "absolute personal knowledge," but of which he has
"reasonable grounds to believe" gained through his senses, would give
the officer the right to make a search incident to such arrest. This in-
direct method of search would be a circumvention of the requirement of
absolute personal knowledge requisite for search without a warrant in
North Carolina, and would appear to be somewhat of a compromise be-
tween an adoption of the Federal rule of "probable cause," and North
Carolina's rule of absolute personal knowledge.
It is doubtful that the legislature intended for a construction to be
placed on the arrest statute which indirectly would so broaden an officer's
2 Smith v. State, 52 Okla. Crim. 333, 4 P. 2d 1076 (1931) ; People v. Chaigles,
237 N. Y. 193, 142 N. E. 583 (1923).
2'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 18-6 (1953).
' 188 N. C. 497, 125 S. E. 24 (1924).2 4MACHEN, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, p. 61 (1950).
= Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925).
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power to search without a warrant. It seems that the legislature intended
to keep the requirement of absolute personal knowledge for an officer to
search without a warrant because the same legislature rejected an amend-
ment to G. S. § 18-6 which read "Provided that nothing in this section
shall be construed to authorize any officer to search any vehicle or bag-
gage of any person without a search warrant duly issued except where
the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that there is intoxicating
liquor in such vehicle." 26 This rejected amendment would grant broader
power to search without warrant than would the above construction of
the arrest statute as the rejected amendment would allow an officer to
search without warrant on reliable information gained from others.
However, in the line of cases in which the officer has gained his informa-
tion through the use of his senses, the suggested construction might
broaden the officer's powers more than the rejected amendment, be-
cause the latter has some precautionary measures which aren't present
in the arrest statute.
Thus it seems that the legislature intended that for an officer to arrest
without a warrant, he must have more than reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that a crime is being committed, even if he gained his reasons for
this belief through his senses. As has been pointed out, "in his presence"
often is treated synomymously with "within his immediate knowledge."
Therefore for one to have reasonable grounds to believe that a crime is
being committed "in his presence," he must have reasonable grounds to
believe that it is within his immediate knowledge. He must have knowl-
edge through his senses, of such facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonable man to believe that he had observed some part of the com-
mission of the crime. Thus if an officer happened to make a mistake,
and though he had actual knowledge through his senses of such facts and
circumstances as would cause a reasonable man to believe that he had
observed the commission of a crime, when in fact no crime was being
committed, the clause "reasonable grounds to believe a crime is committed
in his presence" would relieve the officer from any liability for his mis-
takes.
Other states have reached a similar result by judicial interpretation
of "in his presence." In Snyder v. United States,2 7 circuit Judge
Woods, dissenting on the particular facts, agreed with the proposition
of the majority on the requirements of "in his presence," saying ". . . an
officer must have personal knowledge acquired at the time through his
hearing, sight, or other senses of the present commission of the crime
by the accused. But this does not preclude the idea that the requisite
knowledge may be based on a practically certain inference drawn by a
" Proposed House Bill, number 569, reported unfavorably April 7, 1955.27285 Fed. 1, 4 (4th Cir. 1922).
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reasonable mind from the testimony of the senses." (Emphasis added.)
In LeFavre v. State,28 the Maryland court stated "... an offense is com-
mitted in his presence or view if, through his senses he had knowledge of
facts or circumstances sufficient to justify a sincere belief that accused is
committing the misdemeanor in his presence." The New York court
stated in People v. Esposito,2 9 "If a police officer is in bodily reach of a
person then and there engaged in the commission of a misdemeanor, and
perceiving indications of the commission of the offense sufficient to induce
reasonable belief of the fact, acting in good faith, intending performance
of duty, proceeds to arrest such person, the arrest is lawful as for the
commission of a crime in the officer's presence." This seems to be what
the legislature intended by adding the clause "reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that it is committed in his presence." Nor does it seem that the
legislature intended our statute to be broader than these interpretations.
Thus the test would seem to be: Has the officer observed enough facts
and circumstances through his senses or personal observation as should
reasonably cause him to believe that he is presently observing the com-
mission of the crime.
ROBERT L. GRUB, JR.
Eminent Domain in North Carolina-A Case Study
Eminent domain, a term attributable to the famous seventeenth centu-
ry jurist, Hugo Grotius, means the right of the state or of a person
acting for the state to use, alienate, or destroy property of a citizen for
the ends of public utility.1 This right, also called the power of con-
demnation, belongs to every independent government as an incident of
its sovereignty and needs no constitutional recognition. 2 The right is
founded upon the fact that such property is to be used only for the benefit
of the general publics and it is allowed only so far as it is necessary for
the proper construction and use of the improvement for which it is taken. 4
The policy underlying the authority to condemn is to prevent an owner
aware of the necessity of the taker from making the most of such necessity
and demanding an outrageously high price.5 With the upsurge in the
development of super highways and hydroelectric dams and the rede-
velopment of urban areas, eminent domain is an area of the law that is
gaining in importance in this state and elsewhere. Thus it seems worth-
"8208 Md. 52, 56, 116 A. 2d 368, 369 (1955), case reversed on lack of evidence
in 118 A. 2d 639 (1955).
29 118 Misc. 867, 194 N. Y. Supp. 326, 332 (Sp. Sess. 1922).
1Wissler v. Yadkin River Power Co., 158 N. C. 465, 74 S. E. 2d 460 (1912).
'Jeffress v. Town of Greenville, 154 N. C. 490, 70 S. E. 2d 919 (1911).3 Sparrow v. Dixie Leaf Tobacco Co., 232 N. C. 589, 61 S. E. 2d 700 (1950).
'Spencer v. Willis, 179 N. C. 175, 178, 102 S. E. 275, 277 (1920) (dictum).5 Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Moss, 220 N. C. 200, 17 S. E. 2d 10 (1941).
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